Explaining all three-alternative voting outcomes

DOI10.1006/jeth.1999.2541zbMath1016.91029OpenAlexW1974083162MaRDI QIDQ1806204

Donald G. Saari

Publication date: 20 December 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/4d67be3323079a62d0ddab393816c85926b19fcb

zbMATH Keywords

Condorcet winnerpreference aggregation paradoxesvoting outcomes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

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