A comparison of some distance-based choice rules in ranking environments
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Publication:1774547
DOI10.1007/s11238-004-3671-9zbMath1097.91034OpenAlexW2057216646MaRDI QIDQ1774547
Publication date: 17 May 2005
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-004-3671-9
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