A comparison of some distance-based choice rules in ranking environments

DOI10.1007/s11238-004-3671-9zbMath1097.91034OpenAlexW2057216646MaRDI QIDQ1774547

Hannu Nurmi

Publication date: 17 May 2005

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-004-3671-9

zbMATH Keywords

Borda countDodgson's methodGeometry of votingKemeny's ruleLitvak's medianPositional procedures

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

On stable rules for selecting committees ⋮ A distance measure for choice functions ⋮ Level \(r\) consensus and stable social choice ⋮ A Geometric Approach to Paradoxes of Majority Voting: From Anscombe’s Paradox to the Discursive Dilemma with Saari and Nurmi ⋮ Methods for distance-based judgment aggregation ⋮ Some Remarks on Dodgson's Voting Rule

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