Consequences of reversing preferences
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Publication:2580249
DOI10.1007/BF02984858zbMATH Open1266.91022OpenAlexW2028400863MaRDI QIDQ2580249FDOQ2580249
Authors: Donald G. Saari, Steven Barney
Publication date: 2003
Published in: The Mathematical Intelligencer (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02984858
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Cites Work
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Cited In (13)
- On the reversal bias of the minimax social choice correspondence
- A solution for abstract decision problems based on maximum flow value
- Breaking ties in collective decision-making
- A comparison of some distance-based choice rules in ranking environments
- Scoring rules and social choice properties: some characterizations
- One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness
- Two‐stage majoritarian choice
- Combinatorics of Election Scores
- Resolute refinements of social choice correspondences
- The flow network method
- Approval voting under dichotomous preferences: a catalogue of characterizations
- On the structure of stable tournament solutions
- Some Remarks on Dodgson's Voting Rule
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