Mathematical structure of voting paradoxes. I: Pairwise votes
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1969020
DOI10.1007/s001990050001zbMath1080.91022OpenAlexW1967886354MaRDI QIDQ1969020
Publication date: 22 June 2000
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050001
Related Items
Weighted scoring elections: is Borda best?, Chaos, but in voting and apportionments?, Optimality in Social Choice, Connecting pairwise and positional election outcomes, Complexity and the geometry of voting, A simple characterization of approval voting, The costs of implementing the majority principle: The golden voting rule, Transitivity measurements of fuzzy preference relations, Basis for binary comparisons and non-standard probabilities, When ties are possible: weak Condorcet winners and Arrovian rationality, Decomposition behavior in aggregated data sets, Level \(r\) consensus and stable social choice, On the selection of the same winner by all scoring rules, Representation theory of the symmetric group in voting theory and game theory, On removing Condorcet effects from pairwise election tallies, Unifying voting theory from Nakamura's to Greenberg's theorems, A characterization result for approval voting with a variable set of alternatives, Robustness against inefficient manipulation, Positional rules and \(q\)-Condorcet consistency, An efficiency characterization of plurality rule in collective choice problems, Explaining All Possible Paired Comparison Problems, The profile structure for Luce's choice axiom, Pareto efficiency with spatial rights, A comparison of some distance-based choice rules in ranking environments, Why the Count de Borda cannot beat the Marquis de Condorcet, From Black’s Advice and Arrow’s Theorem to the Gibbard–Satterthewaite Result, Connections and Implications of the Ostrogorski Paradox for Spatial Voting Models, Borda and condorcet: Some distance results, Coalition formation games with separable preferences., Using the Borda rule for ranking sets of objects, A New Way to Analyze Paired Comparison Rules, Consequences of reversing preferences, Scoring rules and social choice properties: some characterizations
