Positional rules and q-Condorcet consistency
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Recommendations
- The \(q\)-majority efficiency of positional rules
- The Borda rule, Condorcet consistency and Condorcet stability
- Constant scoring rules, Condorcet criteria and single-peaked preferences
- Regles positionnelles iteratives, principe majoritaire et preferences unimodales
- On the likelihood of Condorcet's profiles
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1414348 (Why is no real title available?)
- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
- Constant scoring rules, Condorcet criteria and single-peaked preferences
- Geometry of voting
- Mathematical structure of voting paradoxes. I: Pairwise votes
- Social Choice Scoring Functions
- The Borda rule, Condorcet consistency and Condorcet stability
- The \(q\)-majority efficiency of positional rules
- The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
Cited in
(11)- Rationalizations of Condorcet-consistent rules via distances of Hamming type
- On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules
- Social acceptability of Condorcet committees
- Positionalist voting rules: a general definition and axiomatic characterizations
- Majority properties of positional social preference correspondences
- The reinforcement axiom under sequential positional rules
- The \(q\)-majority efficiency of positional rules
- Condorcet Efficiency of General Weighted Scoring Rules Under IAC: Indifference and Abstention
- Regles positionnelles iteratives, principe majoritaire et preferences unimodales
- Positional voting methods satisfying the weak mutual majority and Condorcet loser principles
- Ensuring every candidate wins under positional voting
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