Positional rules and q-Condorcet consistency

DOI10.1007/S10058-015-0173-XzbMATH Open1329.91037OpenAlexW2013998334MaRDI QIDQ497946FDOQ497946

Authors S. Courtin, Mathieu Martin, Bertrand Tchantcho

Publication date 25 September 2015

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-015-0173-x

zbMATH Keywords

\(q\)-majorityCondorcet consistencypositional rules (simple and sequential)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1414348 (Why is no real title available?)
• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
• Constant scoring rules, Condorcet criteria and single-peaked preferences
• Geometry of voting
• Mathematical structure of voting paradoxes. I: Pairwise votes
• Social Choice Scoring Functions
• The Borda rule, Condorcet consistency and Condorcet stability
• The \(q\)-majority efficiency of positional rules
• The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences

Cited in

(11)

• Rationalizations of Condorcet-consistent rules via distances of Hamming type
• On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules
• Social acceptability of Condorcet committees
• Positionalist voting rules: a general definition and axiomatic characterizations
• Majority properties of positional social preference correspondences
• The reinforcement axiom under sequential positional rules
• The \(q\)-majority efficiency of positional rules
• Condorcet Efficiency of General Weighted Scoring Rules Under IAC: Indifference and Abstention
• Regles positionnelles iteratives, principe majoritaire et preferences unimodales
• Positional voting methods satisfying the weak mutual majority and Condorcet loser principles
• Ensuring every candidate wins under positional voting

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