Positional rules and q-Condorcet consistency

DOI10.1007/S10058-015-0173-XzbMATH Open1329.91037OpenAlexW2013998334MaRDI QIDQ497946FDOQ497946

Authors: S. Courtin, Mathieu Martin, Bertrand Tchantcho 

Publication date: 25 September 2015

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-015-0173-x

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zbMATH Keywords

\(q\)-majorityCondorcet consistencypositional rules (simple and sequential)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
• Geometry of voting
• The Borda rule, Condorcet consistency and Condorcet stability
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
• Social Choice Scoring Functions
• Mathematical structure of voting paradoxes. I: Pairwise votes
• Constant scoring rules, Condorcet criteria and single-peaked preferences
• The \(q\)-majority efficiency of positional rules

Cited In (11)

• Condorcet Efficiency of General Weighted Scoring Rules Under IAC: Indifference and Abstention
• Ensuring every candidate wins under positional voting
• Regles positionnelles iteratives, principe majoritaire et preferences unimodales
• Positional voting methods satisfying the weak mutual majority and Condorcet loser principles
• The reinforcement axiom under sequential positional rules
• Positionalist voting rules: a general definition and axiomatic characterizations
• Majority properties of positional social preference correspondences
• Social acceptability of Condorcet committees
• The \(q\)-majority efficiency of positional rules
• On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules
• Rationalizations of Condorcet-consistent rules via distances of Hamming type

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