The reinforcement axiom under sequential positional rules

DOI10.1007/S00355-010-0449-6MaRDI QIDQ1959697zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors S. Courtin, Boniface Mbih, Issofa Moyouwou, Thomas Senné

Publication date 7 October 2010

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0449-6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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• Constant scoring rules, Condorcet criteria and single-peaked preferences
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 44383 (Why is no real title available?)
• On the positive association of parliamentary social choice functions
• Scoring run-off paradoxes for variable electorates
• Social Choice Scoring Functions

Cited in

(1)

• Are Condorcet procedures so bad according to the reinforcement axiom?

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