Condorcet’s Paradox
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Publication:5483165
DOI10.1007/3-540-33799-7zbMath1122.91027OpenAlexW4243394487WikidataQ56644736 ScholiaQ56644736MaRDI QIDQ5483165
Publication date: 16 August 2006
Published in: Theory and Decision Library C: (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-33799-7
Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)
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