Borda's paradox with weighted scoring rules
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Publication:656803
DOI10.1007/S00355-010-0522-1zbMATH Open1278.91051OpenAlexW2085650026MaRDI QIDQ656803FDOQ656803
Mostapha Diss, William V. Gehrlein
Publication date: 13 January 2012
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0522-1
Recommendations
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- A formula for incorporating weights into scoring rules
- Proper scoring rules with arbitrary value functions
- The probability that all weighted scoring rules elect the same winner
- Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules
- Existence and uniqueness of proper scoring rules
Cites Work
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- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Which scoring rule maximizes condorcet efficiency under IAC?
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- Condorcet’s Paradox
- The Borda method is most likely to respect the Condorcet principle
- On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules
- The effectiveness of weighted scoring rules when pairwise majority rule cycles exist.
- The plurality majority converse under single peakedness
- A representation for quadrivariate normal positive orthant probabilities
- On the probability of observing Borda's paradox
Cited In (13)
- Another perspective on Borda's paradox
- How many voters are needed for paradoxes?
- Condorcet Efficiency of General Weighted Scoring Rules Under IAC: Indifference and Abstention
- A note on approval voting and electing the Condorcet loser
- Likelihood of voting outcomes with generalized IAC probabilities
- Social acceptability of Condorcet committees
- Analyzing the Practical Relevance of the Condorcet Loser Paradox and the Agenda Contraction Paradox
- IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report
- Susceptibility to Manipulation by Sincere Truncation: The Case of Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Systems
- Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation
- Condorcet efficiency of the preference approval voting and the probability of selecting the Condorcet loser
- The effectiveness of weighted scoring rules when pairwise majority rule cycles exist.
- The impact of indifferent voters on the likelihood of some voting paradoxes
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