Which scoring rule maximizes condorcet efficiency under IAC?

DOI10.1007/s11238-005-6594-1zbMath1126.91017OpenAlexW2055403057MaRDI QIDQ816096

William S. Zwicker, William V. Gehrlein, Davide P. Cervone

Publication date: 20 February 2006

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-005-6594-1

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (21)

Consistent collective decisions under majorities based on difference of votes ⋮ A note on approval voting and electing the Condorcet loser ⋮ Weighted scoring elections: is Borda best? ⋮ Should voters be required to rank candidates in an election? ⋮ Condorcet Efficiency of General Weighted Scoring Rules Under IAC: Indifference and Abstention ⋮ The Effect of Closeness on the Election of a Pairwise Majority Rule Winner ⋮ Susceptibility to Manipulation by Sincere Truncation: The Case of Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Systems ⋮ From Gehrlein-Fishburn’s Method on Frequency Representation to a Direct Proof of Ehrhart’s extended Conjecture ⋮ IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report ⋮ Likelihood of voting outcomes with generalized IAC probabilities ⋮ Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation ⋮ Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: consistency and paradoxes ⋮ Developing the aggregate empirical side of computational social choice ⋮ Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings ⋮ The effectiveness of weighted scoring rules when pairwise majority rule cycles exist. ⋮ The impact of voters' preference diversity on the probability of some electoral outcomes ⋮ Borda's paradox with weighted scoring rules ⋮ Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis ⋮ Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules ⋮ On the Condorcet Efficiency of Approval Voting and Extended Scoring Rules for Three Alternatives ⋮ Social acceptability of Condorcet committees

Cites Work

• On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules
• The likelihood of dubious election outcomes
• Beta distributions in a simplex and impartial anonymous cultures
• The Borda method is most likely to respect the Condorcet principle
• Condorcet's paradox and the likelihood of its occurrence: Different perspectives on balanced preferences
• Analytical representation of probabilities under the IAC condition
• Scoring rules, Condorcet efficiency and social homogeneity
• Unnamed Item

This page was built for publication: Which scoring rule maximizes condorcet efficiency under IAC?