The effectiveness of weighted scoring rules when pairwise majority rule cycles exist.
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Publication:1420529
DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(03)00080-5zbMath1069.91024MaRDI QIDQ1420529
Publication date: 2 February 2004
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
91B12: Voting theory
Related Items
Unnamed Item, Borda's paradox with weighted scoring rules, Counting linear extension majority cycles in partially ordered sets on up to 13 elements, Condorcet efficiency of the preference approval voting and the probability of selecting the Condorcet loser
Cites Work
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