The effectiveness of weighted scoring rules when pairwise majority rule cycles exist.
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Publication:1420529
DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(03)00080-5zbMath1069.91024MaRDI QIDQ1420529
Publication date: 2 February 2004
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (4)
Borda's paradox with weighted scoring rules ⋮ Counting linear extension majority cycles in partially ordered sets on up to 13 elements ⋮ Condorcet efficiency of the preference approval voting and the probability of selecting the Condorcet loser ⋮ Unnamed Item
Cites Work
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- A representation for quadrivariate normal positive orthant probabilities
- The Condorcet efficiency of Borda Rule with anonymous voters
- Scoring rules, Condorcet efficiency and social homogeneity
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