Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3148878 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3400720 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
- Condorcet Social Choice Functions
- Social Choice Scoring Functions
- Social choice and individual values
Cited in
(23)- Minimal envy and popular matchings
- Studies in Computational Aspects of Voting
- On stable rules for selecting committees
- Parameterized computational complexity of Dodgson and Young elections
- The complexity landscape of outcome determination in judgment aggregation
- Parameterized Computational Complexity of Dodgson and Young Elections
- Voting procedures, complexity of
- The complexity of online bribery in sequential elections
- Are there any nicely structured preference profiles nearby?
- Condorcet consistency and the strong no show paradoxes
- Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules
- Control of Condorcet voting: complexity and a relation-algebraic approach
- A partial taxonomy of judgment aggregation rules and their properties
- Hybrid Elections Broaden Complexity-Theoretic Resistance to Control
- Approximate Condorcet partitioning: solving large-scale rank aggregation problems
- Measuring violations of positive involvement in voting
- Welfare maximization entices participation
- An impossibility theorem concerning positive involvement in voting
- A theory of coalition formation in committees
- On the approximability of Dodgson and Young elections
- Rationalizations of Condorcet-consistent rules via distances of Hamming type
- Distance rationalization of voting rules
- The effectiveness of weighted scoring rules when pairwise majority rule cycles exist.
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