The Condorcet efficiency of Borda Rule with anonymous voters
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Publication:5932216
DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(00)00047-0zbMath0977.91014MaRDI QIDQ5932216
Dominique Lepelley, William V. Gehrlein
Publication date: 6 May 2001
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
91B12: Voting theory
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