The Borda method is most likely to respect the Condorcet principle

DOI10.1007/BF01213253zbMath0810.90023MaRDI QIDQ1339031

Jill Van Newenhizen

Publication date: 18 December 1994

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Borda Countweighted voting systems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

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Weighted scoring elections: is Borda best?, Construction of voting situations concordant with ranking patterns, Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: consistency and paradoxes, Manipulation can be hard in tractable voting systems even for constant-sized coalitions, Borda's paradox with weighted scoring rules, Preference densities and social choices, On the probability that all decision rules select the same winner, The Condorcet efficiency of Borda Rule with anonymous voters, The impact of indifferent voters on the likelihood of some voting paradoxes, On the probability of observing Borda's paradox, Explaining all three-alternative voting outcomes, On the Condorcet Efficiency of Approval Voting and Extended Scoring Rules for Three Alternatives, On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules, Beta distributions in a simplex and impartial anonymous cultures, Which scoring rule maximizes condorcet efficiency under IAC?

Cites Work

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• The Borda dictionary
• A dictionary for voting paradoxes
• Majority efficiencies for simple voting procedures: Summary and interpretation
• The source of some paradoxes from social choice and probability
• The ultimate of chaos resulting from weighted voting systems
• Inconsistencies of Weighted Summation Voting Systems
• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate