On the Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and extended scoring rules for three alternatives
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Recommendations
- The Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and the probability of electing the Condorcet loser
- On the Condorcet efficiency of evaluative voting (and other voting rules) with trichotomous preferences
- Approval voting under dichotomous preferences: a catalogue of characterizations
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3854738
- Condorcet efficiency of the preference approval voting and the probability of selecting the Condorcet loser
Cites work
- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
- Analytical representation of probabilities under the IAC condition
- Condorcet efficiency: A preference for indifference
- On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory
- On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules
- Probabilities of election outcomes for large electorates
- Robustness of positional scoring over subsets of alternatives
- The Borda method is most likely to respect the Condorcet principle
- The Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and the probability of electing the Condorcet loser
- The impact of indifferent voters on the likelihood of some voting paradoxes
- The likelihood of dubious election outcomes
- Which scoring rule maximizes condorcet efficiency under IAC?
Cited in
(9)- Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation
- On the Condorcet efficiency of evaluative voting (and other voting rules) with trichotomous preferences
- Condorcet efficiency of the preference approval voting and the probability of selecting the Condorcet loser
- On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules
- A note on approval voting and electing the Condorcet loser
- Three new models for preference voting and aggregation
- Condorcet Efficiency of General Weighted Scoring Rules Under IAC: Indifference and Abstention
- The Effect of Closeness on the Election of a Pairwise Majority Rule Winner
- Condorcet efficiency: weighted Bucklin vs. weighted scoring and Borda
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