On the Condorcet Efficiency of Approval Voting and Extended Scoring Rules for Three Alternatives

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_11zbMATH Open1348.91103OpenAlexW18328610MaRDI QIDQ2829684FDOQ2829684

Fabrice Valognes, Mostapha Diss, Vincent Merlin

Publication date: 8 November 2016

Published in: Studies in Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_11

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory
• Robustness of positional scoring over subsets of alternatives
• Which scoring rule maximizes condorcet efficiency under IAC?
• Probabilities of election outcomes for large electorates
• The Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and the probability of electing the Condorcet loser
• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
• Analytical representation of probabilities under the IAC condition
• The Borda method is most likely to respect the Condorcet principle
• On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules
• Condorcet efficiency: A preference for indifference
• The impact of indifferent voters on the likelihood of some voting paradoxes
• The likelihood of dubious election outcomes

Cited In (8)

• Condorcet Efficiency of General Weighted Scoring Rules Under IAC: Indifference and Abstention
• A note on approval voting and electing the Condorcet loser
• Three new models for preference voting and aggregation
• On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules
• The Effect of Closeness on the Election of a Pairwise Majority Rule Winner
• Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation
• On the Condorcet efficiency of evaluative voting (and other voting rules) with trichotomous preferences
• Condorcet efficiency of the preference approval voting and the probability of selecting the Condorcet loser

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