On the Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and extended scoring rules for three alternatives

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_11MaRDI QIDQ2829684zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mostapha Diss, Fabrice Valognes, Vincent Merlin

Publication date 8 November 2016

Published in Studies in Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_11

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
• Analytical representation of probabilities under the IAC condition
• Condorcet efficiency: A preference for indifference
• On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory
• On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules
• Probabilities of election outcomes for large electorates
• Robustness of positional scoring over subsets of alternatives
• The Borda method is most likely to respect the Condorcet principle
• The Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and the probability of electing the Condorcet loser
• The impact of indifferent voters on the likelihood of some voting paradoxes
• The likelihood of dubious election outcomes
• Which scoring rule maximizes condorcet efficiency under IAC?

Cited in

(9)

• Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation
• On the Condorcet efficiency of evaluative voting (and other voting rules) with trichotomous preferences
• Condorcet efficiency of the preference approval voting and the probability of selecting the Condorcet loser
• On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules
• A note on approval voting and electing the Condorcet loser
• Three new models for preference voting and aggregation
• Condorcet Efficiency of General Weighted Scoring Rules Under IAC: Indifference and Abstention
• The Effect of Closeness on the Election of a Pairwise Majority Rule Winner
• Condorcet efficiency: weighted Bucklin vs. weighted scoring and Borda

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