On the Condorcet Efficiency of Approval Voting and Extended Scoring Rules for Three Alternatives
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Publication:2829684
DOI10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_11zbMath1348.91103OpenAlexW18328610MaRDI QIDQ2829684
Fabrice Valognes, Mostapha Diss, Vincent R. Merlin
Publication date: 8 November 2016
Published in: Studies in Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_11
Related Items (7)
A note on approval voting and electing the Condorcet loser ⋮ Condorcet Efficiency of General Weighted Scoring Rules Under IAC: Indifference and Abstention ⋮ The Effect of Closeness on the Election of a Pairwise Majority Rule Winner ⋮ On the Condorcet efficiency of evaluative voting (and other voting rules) with trichotomous preferences ⋮ Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation ⋮ On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules ⋮ Condorcet efficiency of the preference approval voting and the probability of selecting the Condorcet loser
Cites Work
- Robustness of positional scoring over subsets of alternatives
- Which scoring rule maximizes condorcet efficiency under IAC?
- Probabilities of election outcomes for large electorates
- On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules
- The likelihood of dubious election outcomes
- The Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and the probability of electing the Condorcet loser
- The Borda method is most likely to respect the Condorcet principle
- The impact of indifferent voters on the likelihood of some voting paradoxes
- Analytical representation of probabilities under the IAC condition
- Condorcet efficiency: A preference for indifference
- On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory
- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
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