The Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and the probability of electing the Condorcet loser
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Publication:1300394
DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(97)00020-7zbMath0953.91006MaRDI QIDQ1300394
Dominique Lepelley, William V. Gehrlein
Publication date: 1 September 1999
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
91B12: Voting theory
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