The Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and the probability of electing the Condorcet loser

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(97)00020-7zbMath0953.91006MaRDI QIDQ1300394

William V. Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley

Publication date: 1 September 1999

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Condorcet efficiencyapproval voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items

A note on approval voting and electing the Condorcet loser ⋮ Modeling country risk ratings using partial orders ⋮ On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules ⋮ Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis ⋮ The impact of indifferent voters on the likelihood of some voting paradoxes ⋮ Condorcet vs. Borda in light of a dual majoritarian approach ⋮ On the Condorcet Efficiency of Approval Voting and Extended Scoring Rules for Three Alternatives ⋮ Condorcet efficiency of the preference approval voting and the probability of selecting the Condorcet loser ⋮ On the model dependence of majority preference relations reconstructed from ballot or survey data

Cites Work

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• Condorcet's paradox
• Probabilities of election outcomes for large electorates
• On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules
• On the probability of electing the Condorcet loser