Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2463576
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2007.05.003zbMATH Open1141.91379arXiv1202.3493OpenAlexW3099835759MaRDI QIDQ2463576FDOQ2463576
Authors: Mark C. Wilson, Geoffrey Pritchard 
Publication date: 14 December 2007
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: We show how powerful algorithms recently developed for counting lattice points and computing volumes of convex polyhedra can be used to compute probabilities of a wide variety of events of interest in social choice theory. Several illustrative examples are given.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1202.3493
Recommendations
- Exploiting polyhedral symmetries in social choice
- An example of probability computations under the IAC assumption: the stability of scoring rules
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 878682
- On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory
- Computations of volumes and Ehrhart series in four candidates elections
votingconvex polytopesocial choiceEhrhart quasipolynomialimpartial anonymous culturecounting lattice points in polyhedra
Social choice (91B14) Geometric probability and stochastic geometry (60D05) Combinatorial probability (60C05) Length, area, volume and convex sets (aspects of convex geometry) (52A38) Computational aspects related to convexity (52B55) Lattices and convex bodies in (n) dimensions (aspects of discrete geometry) (52C07) Voting theory (91B12)
Cites Work
- Effective lattice point counting in rational convex polytopes
- The many aspects of counting lattice points in polytopes
- On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Which scoring rule maximizes condorcet efficiency under IAC?
- The Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and the probability of electing the Condorcet loser
- On the probability of electing the Condorcet loser
- Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules
- Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Condorcet efficiency of simple voting rules for large electorates
- The minimum period of the Ehrhart quasi-polynomial of a rational polytope
- Condorcet’s Paradox
- The probability of conflicts in a U. S. presidential type election
- Analytical representation of probabilities under the IAC condition
- Obtaining representations for probabilities of voting outcomes with effectively unlimited precision integer arithmetic
- Condorcet efficiency and constant scoring rules
- The vulnerability of four social choice functions to coalitional manipulation of preferences
- The proportion of coalitionally unstable situations under the plurality rule
- Condorcet's paradox and the likelihood of its occurrence: Different perspectives on balanced preferences
- On the probability that all decision rules select the same winner
- Scoring run-off paradoxes for variable electorates
- Computing the period of an Ehrhart quasi-polynomial
Cited In (32)
- Exploiting symmetries in polyhedral computations
- Computations of volumes and Ehrhart series in four candidates elections
- Consistent collective decisions under majorities based on difference of votes
- Exploiting polyhedral symmetries in social choice
- Are Condorcet procedures so bad according to the reinforcement axiom?
- A note on approval voting and electing the Condorcet loser
- On the positive association of parliamentary social choice functions
- The impact of voters' preference diversity on the probability of some electoral outcomes
- Asymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size for positional voting rules under impartial culture behaviour
- Three ways to compute accurately the probability of the referendum paradox
- Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules
- Correlation, partitioning and the probability of casting a decisive vote under the majority rule
- Probabilities of electoral outcomes: from three-candidate to four-candidate elections
- On the likelihood of dummy players in weighted majority games
- An example of probability computations under the IAC assumption: the stability of scoring rules
- Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings
- On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory
- Majority properties of positional social preference correspondences
- The computation of generalized Ehrhart series in normaliz
- Social unacceptability for simple voting procedures
- Social acceptability of Condorcet committees
- Monotonicity paradoxes in three-candidate elections using scoring elimination rules
- Analyzing the Practical Relevance of the Condorcet Loser Paradox and the Agenda Contraction Paradox
- Exploring the No-Show Paradox for Condorcet Extensions
- IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report
- Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules
- Analytical representation of probabilities under the IAC condition
- Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation
- On the probability of observing Borda's paradox
- Obtaining representations for probabilities of voting outcomes with effectively unlimited precision integer arithmetic
- On the Condorcet efficiency of evaluative voting (and other voting rules) with trichotomous preferences
- On Dedekind's problem for complete simple games
Uses Software
This page was built for publication: Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2463576)
