Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2007.05.003MaRDI QIDQ2463576zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mark C. Wilson, Geoffrey Pritchard

Publication date 14 December 2007

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1202.3493

zbMATH Keywords

votingconvex polytopesocial choiceEhrhart quasipolynomialimpartial anonymous culturecounting lattice points in polyhedra

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Geometric probability and stochastic geometry (60D05) Combinatorial probability (60C05) Length, area, volume and convex sets (aspects of convex geometry) (52A38) Computational aspects related to convexity (52B55) Lattices and convex bodies in (n) dimensions (aspects of discrete geometry) (52C07) Voting theory (91B12)

Abstract: We show how powerful algorithms recently developed for counting lattice points and computing volumes of convex polyhedra can be used to compute probabilities of a wide variety of events of interest in social choice theory. Several illustrative examples are given.

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 992411 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1538124 (Why is no real title available?)
• Analytical representation of probabilities under the IAC condition
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• The proportion of coalitionally unstable situations under the plurality rule
• The vulnerability of four social choice functions to coalitional manipulation of preferences
• Which scoring rule maximizes condorcet efficiency under IAC?

Cited in

(32)

• Exploiting symmetries in polyhedral computations
• Computations of volumes and Ehrhart series in four candidates elections
• Consistent collective decisions under majorities based on difference of votes
• Exploiting polyhedral symmetries in social choice
• Are Condorcet procedures so bad according to the reinforcement axiom?
• A note on approval voting and electing the Condorcet loser
• The impact of voters' preference diversity on the probability of some electoral outcomes
• On the positive association of parliamentary social choice functions
• Asymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size for positional voting rules under impartial culture behaviour
• Three ways to compute accurately the probability of the referendum paradox
• Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules
• Correlation, partitioning and the probability of casting a decisive vote under the majority rule
• Probabilities of electoral outcomes: from three-candidate to four-candidate elections
• An example of probability computations under the IAC assumption: the stability of scoring rules
• Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings
• On the likelihood of dummy players in weighted majority games
• On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory
• The computation of generalized Ehrhart series in normaliz
• Majority properties of positional social preference correspondences
• Social unacceptability for simple voting procedures
• Social acceptability of Condorcet committees
• Monotonicity paradoxes in three-candidate elections using scoring elimination rules
• Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules
• Analyzing the Practical Relevance of the Condorcet Loser Paradox and the Agenda Contraction Paradox
• Exploring the No-Show Paradox for Condorcet Extensions
• IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report
• Analytical representation of probabilities under the IAC condition
• Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation
• On the probability of observing Borda's paradox
• Obtaining representations for probabilities of voting outcomes with effectively unlimited precision integer arithmetic
• On the Condorcet efficiency of evaluative voting (and other voting rules) with trichotomous preferences
• On Dedekind's problem for complete simple games

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