Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.05.003zbMath1141.91379arXiv1202.3493MaRDI QIDQ2463576

Geoffrey Pritchard, Mark C. Wilson

Publication date: 14 December 2007

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1202.3493

zbMATH Keywords

convex polytope; voting; social choice; Ehrhart quasipolynomial; impartial anonymous culture; counting lattice points in polyhedra

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

60D05: Geometric probability and stochastic geometry

52C07: Lattices and convex bodies in (n) dimensions (aspects of discrete geometry)

52B55: Computational aspects related to convexity

91B12: Voting theory

60C05: Combinatorial probability

52A38: Length, area, volume and convex sets (aspects of convex geometry)

91B14: Social choice

Related Items

Three ways to compute accurately the probability of the referendum paradox, On the probability of observing Borda's paradox, On the positive association of parliamentary social choice functions, Asymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size for positional voting rules under impartial culture behaviour, On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory

Uses Software

• LattE

Cites Work

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