Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation
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Publication:1680740
Recommendations
- Asymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size for positional voting rules under impartial culture behaviour
- Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules
- On the average minimum size of a manipulating coalition
- The vulnerability of four social choice functions to coalitional manipulation of preferences
- The asymptotic strategyproofness of scoring and Condorcet consistent rules
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1538124 (Why is no real title available?)
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- Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules
- Exploiting polyhedral symmetries in social choice
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- The likelihood of monotonicity paradoxes in run-off elections
- The proportion of coalitionally unstable situations under the plurality rule
- The vulnerability of four social choice functions to coalitional manipulation of preferences
- Two Algorithms for Determining Volumes of Convex Polyhedra
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- Which scoring rule maximizes condorcet efficiency under IAC?
Cited in
(12)- On asymptotic strategy-proofness of the plurality and the run-off rules
- Susceptibility to Manipulation by Sincere Truncation: The Case of Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Systems
- How the size of a coalition affects its chances to influence an election
- The proportion of coalitionally unstable situations under the plurality rule
- Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules
- From Gehrlein-Fishburn’s Method on Frequency Representation to a Direct Proof of Ehrhart’s extended Conjecture
- Social acceptability of Condorcet committees
- IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report
- Can a Condorcet rule have a low coalitional manipulability
- Asymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size for positional voting rules under impartial culture behaviour
- Condorcet Efficiency of General Weighted Scoring Rules Under IAC: Indifference and Abstention
- Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules
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