Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1680740
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2017.06.006zbMATH Open1415.91114OpenAlexW2739356872MaRDI QIDQ1680740FDOQ1680740
Authors: Issofa Moyouwou, Hugue Tchantcho 
Publication date: 16 November 2017
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.06.006
Recommendations
- Asymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size for positional voting rules under impartial culture behaviour
- Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules
- On the average minimum size of a manipulating coalition
- The vulnerability of four social choice functions to coalitional manipulation of preferences
- The asymptotic strategyproofness of scoring and Condorcet consistent rules
Cites Work
- On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory
- Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis
- Which scoring rule maximizes condorcet efficiency under IAC?
- How frequently do different voting rules encounter voting paradoxes in three-candidate elections?
- On the Condorcet Efficiency of Approval Voting and Extended Scoring Rules for Three Alternatives
- Two Algorithms for Determining Volumes of Convex Polyhedra
- The impact of voters' preference diversity on the probability of some electoral outcomes
- Borda's paradox with weighted scoring rules
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Voting paradoxes and group coherence. The Condorcet efficiency of voting rules.
- A Polynomial Time Algorithm for Counting Integral Points in Polyhedra When the Dimension is Fixed
- Polytope Volume Computation
- Condorcet’s Paradox
- Pareto violations of parliamentary voting systems
- Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation.
- Analytical representation of probabilities under the IAC condition
- The vulnerability of four social choice functions to coalitional manipulation of preferences
- The proportion of coalitionally unstable situations under the plurality rule
- Exploiting polyhedral symmetries in social choice
- On the positive association of parliamentary social choice functions
- The likelihood of monotonicity paradoxes in run-off elections
- Monotonicity paradoxes in three-candidate elections using scoring elimination rules
- Interacting double monotonicity failure with direction of impact under five voting methods
- Condorcet winners on four candidates with anonymous voters
Cited In (10)
- Condorcet Efficiency of General Weighted Scoring Rules Under IAC: Indifference and Abstention
- Asymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size for positional voting rules under impartial culture behaviour
- Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules
- Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules
- Social acceptability of Condorcet committees
- How the size of a coalition affects its chances to influence an election
- From Gehrlein-Fishburn’s Method on Frequency Representation to a Direct Proof of Ehrhart’s extended Conjecture
- IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report
- Susceptibility to Manipulation by Sincere Truncation: The Case of Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Systems
- On asymptotic strategy-proofness of the plurality and the run-off rules
This page was built for publication: Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1680740)
