Voting paradoxes and group coherence. The Condorcet efficiency of voting rules.
From MaRDI portal
(Redirected from Publication:628561)
Recommendations
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 992411
- Paradox of voting and the trivial preference set of group decision making
- On some paradoxes in voting theory
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 18299
- Condorcet efficiency of simple voting rules for large electorates
- REMARKS ON A PROCEDURAL CONDITION FOR THE VOTING PARADOX
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1414348
- Mathematical structure of voting paradoxes. I: Pairwise votes
- On the Condorcet efficiency of evaluative voting (and other voting rules) with trichotomous preferences
- The Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and the probability of electing the Condorcet loser
Cited in
(65)- Condorcet’s Paradox
- Polytope volume by descent in the face lattice and applications in social choice
- The likelihood of single-peaked preferences under classic and new probability distribution assumptions
- A probabilistic evaluation framework for preference aggregation reflecting group homogeneity
- Exploiting symmetries in polyhedral computations
- Computations of volumes and Ehrhart series in four candidates elections
- Developing the aggregate empirical side of computational social choice
- Another perspective on Borda's paradox
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 992411 (Why is no real title available?)
- Polytope volume in Normaliz
- Exploiting polyhedral symmetries in social choice
- Are Condorcet procedures so bad according to the reinforcement axiom?
- Analyzing the Probability of Election Outcomes with Abstentions
- Condorcet Efficiency of General Weighted Scoring Rules Under IAC: Indifference and Abstention
- A natural adaptive process for collective decision-making
- The fundamental theorem for the probability calculations of the paradox of voting
- A comparison of theoretical and empirical evaluations of the Borda compromise
- The impact of voters' preference diversity on the probability of some electoral outcomes
- On the positive association of parliamentary social choice functions
- The unexpected behavior of plurality rule
- The difference between manipulability indices in the IC and IANC models
- Borda's paradox under stochastic preference
- Linear programming with infinite, finite, and infinitesimal values in the right-hand side
- Theory and Applications of Relational Structures as Knowledge Instruments
- Social acceptability and the majoritarian compromise rule
- An analysis of random elections with large numbers of voters
- Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules
- Condorcet vs. Borda in light of a dual majoritarian approach
- Likelihood of voting outcomes with generalized IAC probabilities
- Probabilities of electoral outcomes: from three-candidate to four-candidate elections
- The likelihood of a Condorcet winner in the logrolling setting
- When ties are possible: weak Condorcet winners and Arrovian rationality
- Condorcet efficiency with adaptive parties in a spatial model
- On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules
- Similarity Suppresses Cyclicity: Why Similar Competitors Form Hierarchies
- The theoretical Shapley-Shubik probability of an election inversion in a toy symmetric version of the US presidential electoral system
- Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness
- How frequently do different voting rules encounter voting paradoxes in three-candidate elections?
- The voting rules of Kondorse and Bord
- Approximating Condorcet ordering for vector-valued mathematical morphology
- Majority properties of positional social preference correspondences
- An analytical and experimental comparison of maximal lottery schemes
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4183351 (Why is no real title available?)
- Social unacceptability for simple voting procedures
- Social acceptability of Condorcet committees
- The Effect of Closeness on the Election of a Pairwise Majority Rule Winner
- Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation.
- Pareto violations of parliamentary voting systems
- Ranked-choice voting versus first-past-the-post: how polarization shapes their performance
- Combinatorics of Election Scores
- From Gehrlein-Fishburn’s Method on Frequency Representation to a Direct Proof of Ehrhart’s extended Conjecture
- Violations of Reversal Symmetry Under Simple and Runoff Scoring Rules
- The Borda method is most likely to respect the Condorcet principle
- Exploring the No-Show Paradox for Condorcet Extensions
- IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report
- Susceptibility to Manipulation by Sincere Truncation: The Case of Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Systems
- Should voters be required to rank candidates in an election?
- The \(q\)-majority efficiency of positional rules
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3945823 (Why is no real title available?)
- Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation
- The supercovering relation, the pairwise winner, and more missing links between Borda and Condorcet
- On the probability of observing Borda's paradox
- Unanimity and the Anscombe's paradox
- On the Condorcet efficiency of evaluative voting (and other voting rules) with trichotomous preferences
- Multi-objective ranking to optimize CNN's encoding features: application to the optimization of tracer dose for scintigraphic imagery
This page was built for publication: Voting paradoxes and group coherence. The Condorcet efficiency of voting rules.
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q628561)
