Voting paradoxes and group coherence. The Condorcet efficiency of voting rules.

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-03107-6zbMATH Open1252.91001OpenAlexW2493647195MaRDI QIDQ628561FDOQ628561

Authors: William V. Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley 

Publication date: 11 March 2011

Published in: Studies in Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03107-6

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zbMATH Keywords

voting paradoxesvoting rulesCondorcet efficiencygroup coherence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Voting theory (91B12)

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