The difference between manipulability indices in the IC and IANC models

DOI10.1007/S00355-015-0930-3zbMATH Open1403.91136OpenAlexW2224949037MaRDI QIDQ284375FDOQ284375

Yuliya Veselova

Publication date: 18 May 2016

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0930-3

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zbMATH Keywords

social choicemanipulability indexpreference profile

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On strategy-proof social choice correspondences
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Manipulation of social choice functions
• Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't
• Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules
• Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
• Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules
• How the size of a coalition affects its chances to influence an election
• The Impartial, Anonymous, and Neutral Culture Model: A Probability Model for Sampling Public Preference Structures
• Voter Antagonism and the Paradox of Voting
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness
• The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The Manipulability Index in the IANC Model
• Voting paradoxes and group coherence. The Condorcet efficiency of voting rules.
• On strategy-proof social choice correspondences: a comment

Cited In (2)

• The likelihood of single-peaked preferences under classic and new probability distribution assumptions
• Combinatorics of Election Scores

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