The difference between manipulability indices in the IC and IANC models
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Publication:284375
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3126031 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3635767 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1488103 (Why is no real title available?)
- Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't
- Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules
- How the size of a coalition affects its chances to influence an election
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Manipulation of social choice functions
- On strategy-proof social choice correspondences
- On strategy-proof social choice correspondences: a comment
- On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules
- Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules
- Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
- Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance
- The impartial, anonymous, and neutral culture model: a probability model for sampling public preference structures
- The manipulability index in the IANC model
- Voter Antagonism and the Paradox of Voting
- Voting paradoxes and group coherence. The Condorcet efficiency of voting rules.
Cited in
(5)- The likelihood of single-peaked preferences under classic and new probability distribution assumptions
- The impartial, anonymous, and neutral culture model: a probability model for sampling public preference structures
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- Uniform generation of anonymous and neutral preference profiles for social choice rules
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