The likelihood of single-peaked preferences under classic and new probability distribution assumptions
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Publication:826624
DOI10.1007/s00355-020-01258-yzbMath1454.91069OpenAlexW3033715196MaRDI QIDQ826624
Publication date: 6 January 2021
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-020-01258-y
impartial anonymous cultureimpartial culturesingle-peaked preference profilesuniform plurality culture
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Cites Work
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