Are there any nicely structured preference profiles nearby?

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.11.002zbMath1347.91128arXiv1509.04595OpenAlexW2293830771MaRDI QIDQ2634484

Jiehua Chen, Robert Bredereck, Gerhard J. Woeginger

Publication date: 9 February 2016

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1509.04595

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Voting theory (91B12) Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (12)

The likelihood of single-peaked preferences under classic and new probability distribution assumptions ⋮ Testing a mixture model of single-peaked preferences ⋮ The one-dimensional Euclidean domain: finitely many obstructions are not enough ⋮ The control complexity of \(r\)-Approval: from the single-peaked case to the general case ⋮ On the likelihood of single-peaked preferences ⋮ Measuring nearly single-peakedness of an electorate: some new insights ⋮ On the number of single-peaked narcissistic or single-crossing narcissistic preference profiles ⋮ Campaign management under approval-driven voting rules ⋮ Recognizing single-peaked preferences on an arbitrary graph: complexity and algorithms ⋮ Small one-dimensional Euclidean preference profiles ⋮ Parameterized complexity of voter control in multi-peaked elections ⋮ Structured preferences: a literature survey

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Fundamentals of parameterized complexity
• The complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single-peaked electorates
• Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules
• A characterization of the single-peaked domain
• The shield that never was: societies with single-peaked preferences are more open to manipulation and control
• Recognizing one-dimensional Euclidean preference profiles
• Metric rationalisation of social choice functions according to principles of social choice
• Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election
• Extending Condorcet's rule
• Generalized median voter schemes and committees
• Strategy-proof division of a private good when preferences are single-dipped
• Stable matching with preferences derived from a psychological model
• Combinatorial voter control in elections
• The one-dimensional Euclidean domain: finitely many obstructions are not enough
• Rationalizations of Condorcet-consistent rules via distances of Hamming type
• A characterization of the single-crossing domain
• Acyclic sets of linear orders via the Bruhat orders
• Parametrized complexity theory.
• The complexity of fully proportional representation for single-crossing electorates
• On the Computation of Fully Proportional Representation
• Recognizing 1-Euclidean Preferences: An Alternative Approach
• Bypassing Combinatorial Protections: Polynomial-Time Algorithms for Single-Peaked Electorates
• How Large are Transitive Simple Majority Domains?
• A Polynomial Time Algorithm for Unidimensional Unfolding Representations
• Parameterized Algorithms
• A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions
• The Simple Majority Decision Rule
• An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation

This page was built for publication: Are there any nicely structured preference profiles nearby?