The complexity of fully proportional representation for single-crossing electorates

DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2014.12.012zbMath1319.91075OpenAlexW2110060186MaRDI QIDQ2513672

Piotr Faliszewski, Piotr Skowron, Lan Yu, Edith Elkind

Publication date: 28 January 2015

Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2014.12.012

zbMATH Keywords

complexitywinner determinationsingle-crossingChamberlin-Courant's ruleMonroe's rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

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