A characterization of the single-peaked single-crossing domain

DOI10.1007/S00355-019-01216-3MaRDI QIDQ2179455zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Piotr Skowron

Publication date 12 May 2020

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-019-01216-3

zbMATH Keywords

computational complexitysingle-peaked and single-crossing elections

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• A characterization of the single-crossing domain
• A characterization of the single-peaked domain
• A Polynomial Time Algorithm for Unidimensional Unfolding Representations
• An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
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• Bypassing combinatorial protections: polynomial-time algorithms for single-peaked electorates
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• Intermediate preferences and stable coalition structures
• Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule
• On the complexity of Chamberlin-Courant on almost structured profiles
• On the computation of fully proportional representation
• Recognizing 1-Euclidean preferences: an alternative approach
• Recognizing one-dimensional Euclidean preference profiles
• Single-crossing, strategic voting and the median choice rule
• Social choice and individual values
• Stable matching with preferences derived from a psychological model
• The complexity of fully proportional representation for single-crossing electorates
• The complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single-peaked electorates
• The one-dimensional Euclidean domain: finitely many obstructions are not enough
• The shield that never was: societies with single-peaked preferences are more open to manipulation and control
• The Simple Majority Decision Rule
• The single-peaked domain revisited: a simple global characterization
• Top monotonicity: a common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result

Cited in

(12)

• The single-peaked domain revisited: a simple global characterization
• A characterization of preference domains that are single-crossing and maximal Condorcet
• Structured preferences: a literature survey
• Weighted majority tournaments and Kemeny ranking with 2-dimensional Euclidean preferences
• On the parameterized complexity of party nominations
• On single-peaked domains and min-max rules
• A characterization of the single-crossing domain
• Core-stable committees under restricted domains
• Structure of single-peaked preferences
• A characterization of the single-peaked domain
• Solving Woeginger's hiking problem: wonderful partitions in anonymous hedonic games
• Recognizing and eliciting weakly single crossing profiles on trees

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