The single-peaked domain revisited: a simple global characterization

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2018.03.003zbMath1419.91276OpenAlexW2798107862WikidataQ130151745 ScholiaQ130151745MaRDI QIDQ1757559

Clemens D. Puppe

Publication date: 15 January 2019

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://publikationen.bibliothek.kit.edu/1000062015

zbMATH Keywords

majority votingsocial choicesingle-peakednesssingle-crossing propertyrestricted domainsCondorcet domains

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (20)

The likelihood of single-peaked preferences under classic and new probability distribution assumptions ⋮ Probabilistic fixed ballot rules and hybrid domains ⋮ Testing a mixture model of single-peaked preferences ⋮ Pareto rationalizability by two single-peaked preferences ⋮ A characterization of the single-peaked single-crossing domain ⋮ On single-peaked domains and min-max rules ⋮ A classification of peak-pit maximal Condorcet domains ⋮ A taxonomy of non-dictatorial unidimensional domains ⋮ Symmetric maximal Condorcet domains ⋮ Structure of single-peaked preferences ⋮ Towards a classification of maximal peak-pit Condorcet domains ⋮ Necessary and sufficient conditions for pairwise majority decisions on path-connected domains ⋮ Single peaked domains with tree-shaped spectra ⋮ A simple construction of complete single-peaked domains by recursive tiling ⋮ When are efficient and fair assignment mechanisms group strategy-proof? ⋮ How to add apples and oranges: aggregating performances of different nature ⋮ Condorcet domains satisfying Arrow's single-peakedness ⋮ Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure ⋮ Structured preferences: a literature survey ⋮ Constructing large peak-pit Condorcet domains

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