Order restricted preferences and majority rule

DOI10.1007/BF01376281zbMATH Open0727.90008OpenAlexW1999353004MaRDI QIDQ804455FDOQ804455

P. Rothstein

Publication date: 1990

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01376281

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zbMATH Keywords

majority ruleorder restrictionsingle cavednesssingle peakednessvalue restriction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Quasi-Transitivity, Rational Choice and Collective Decisions
• On a Class of Equilibrium Conditions for Majority Rule

Cited In (24)

• Majority voting on restricted domains
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A characterization of the single-crossing domain
• Condorcet winners and social acceptability
• Anonymous monotonic social welfare functions
• Sorting out single-crossing preferences on networks
• Geometric models of consistent judgement aggregation
• The single-peaked domain revisited: a simple global characterization
• Introduction to judgment aggregation
• Voting over flat taxes in an endowment economy
• Majority voting on orders
• Preference exclusions for social rationality
• Single-crossing, strategic voting and the median choice rule
• The political economy of (de)centralization with complementary public goods
• On some axioms for ranking sets of alternatives
• Strategy-proofness of the randomized Condorcet voting system
• Top monotonicity: a common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result
• Pareto principles, positive responsiveness, and majority decisions
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining.
• A classification of peak-pit maximal Condorcet domains
• A bargaining model of endogenous procedures
• ``One and a half dimensional preferences and majority rule
• Citizen candidates under uncertainty
• Judgment aggregation and agenda manipulation

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