Order restricted preferences and majority rule
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Publication:804455
DOI10.1007/BF01376281zbMath0727.90008OpenAlexW1999353004MaRDI QIDQ804455
Publication date: 1990
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01376281
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