Geometric models of consistent judgement aggregation

DOI10.1007/s00355-009-0379-3zbMath1190.91048OpenAlexW1990777695MaRDI QIDQ1039562

Marcus Pivato

Publication date: 23 November 2009

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0379-3

zbMATH Keywords

Voronoi cellvoting ruleconvex profilediamond profilespannable profilesupermajoritarian

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (max. 100)

The Condorcet set: majority voting over interconnected propositions ⋮ OPINION DYNAMICS AND COLLECTIVE DECISIONS ⋮ Propositionwise judgment aggregation: the general case ⋮ Judgment aggregation and agenda manipulation

Cites Work

• Order restricted preferences and majority rule
• Belief merging and the discursive dilemma: an argument-based account to paradoxes of judgment aggregation
• The structure of strategy-proof social choice. I: General characterization and possibility results on median spaces
• A possibility theorem on aggregation over multiple interconnected propositions
• Propositional belief base merging or how to merge beliefs/goals coming from several sources and some links with social choice theory
• Efficient and strategy-proof voting rules: A characterization
• Arrow's theorem in judgment aggregation
• Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule
• A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions

This page was built for publication: Geometric models of consistent judgement aggregation