The Condorcet set: majority voting over interconnected propositions

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2013.12.013zbMATH Open1296.91104OpenAlexW2005460447MaRDI QIDQ402080FDOQ402080

Authors: Klaus Nehring, Marcus Pivato, Clemens Puppe 

Publication date: 27 August 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://publikationen.bibliothek.kit.edu/1000037498/2876486

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zbMATH Keywords

indeterminacyjudgement aggregationsocial choicepath-dependenceCondorcet setsequential majority voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

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• Geometric models of consistent judgement aggregation
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• How indeterminate is sequential majority voting? A judgement aggregation perspective
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Cited In (18)

• Aggregation theory and the relevance of some issues to others
• Majority rule in the absence of a majority
• Incoherent majorities: the McGarvey problem in judgement aggregation
• The complexity landscape of outcome determination in judgment aggregation
• Judgments aggregation by a sequential majority procedure
• The probability of inconsistencies in complex collective decisions
• The single-peaked domain revisited: a simple global characterization
• The median rule in judgement aggregation
• How indeterminate is sequential majority voting? A judgement aggregation perspective
• A possibility theorem on aggregation over multiple interconnected propositions
• A partial taxonomy of judgment aggregation rules and their properties
• Complexity of manipulation and bribery in judgment aggregation for uniform premise-based quota rules
• Weighted representative democracy
• Extremal Restriction, Condorcet Sets, and Majority Decision Making
• Majority judgment over a convex candidate space
• Collective combinatorial optimisation as judgment aggregation
• Social choice and the logic of simple games
• Judgment aggregation and agenda manipulation

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