The Condorcet set: majority voting over interconnected propositions

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2013.12.013zbMath1296.91104MaRDI QIDQ402080

Marcus Pivato, Klaus Nehring, Clemens D. Puppe

Publication date: 27 August 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://publikationen.bibliothek.kit.edu/1000037498/2876486

zbMATH Keywords

social choice; indeterminacy; judgement aggregation; path-dependence; Condorcet set; sequential majority voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B14: Social choice

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The Complexity Landscape of Outcome Determination in Judgment Aggregation, Judgment aggregation and agenda manipulation, Incoherent majorities: the McGarvey problem in judgement aggregation, Aggregation theory and the relevance of some issues to others, Complexity of manipulation and bribery in judgment aggregation for uniform premise-based quota rules, The single-peaked domain revisited: a simple global characterization, Weighted representative democracy, Majority rule in the absence of a majority, A partial taxonomy of judgment aggregation rules and their properties

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