Majority voting on restricted domains

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2010.01.003zbMath1238.91054OpenAlexW2109490607MaRDI QIDQ969117

Christian List, Franz Dietrich

Publication date: 11 May 2010

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/20114/1/Majority_voting_on_restricted_domains_%28LSERO%29.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

majority votingconsistencyjudgment aggregationdomain restrictionMay's theoremanalogues of single-peakednessvalue-restriction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

Introduction to Judgment Aggregation, The theory of judgment aggregation: an introductory review, The doctrinal paradox, the discursive dilemma, and logical aggregation theory, The Condorcet set: majority voting over interconnected propositions, Scoring rules for judgment aggregation, Group control for consent rules with consecutive qualifications, Conference Program Design with Single-Peaked and Single-Crossing Preferences, Quota rules for incomplete judgments, Collective argumentation with topological restrictions, Unnamed Item, Propositionwise judgment aggregation: the general case, A Geometric Approach to Paradoxes of Majority Voting: From Anscombe’s Paradox to the Discursive Dilemma with Saari and Nurmi, Introduction to judgment aggregation, Judgment aggregation and agenda manipulation

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