Single-crossing, strategic voting and the median choice rule
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Publication:2432496
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 44383 (Why is no real title available?)
- A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods
- A possibility theorem on aggregation over multiple interconnected propositions
- A strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule
- An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions
- Are serial Condorcet rules strategy-proof?
- Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule
- Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules with one public good
- Order restricted preferences and majority rule
- Strategy-proofness and ``median voters
Cited in
(22)- A characterization of the single-peaked single-crossing domain
- Majority voting on restricted domains
- Intergovernmental negotiation, willingness to compromise, and voter preference reversals
- A characterization of the single-crossing domain
- Condorcet winners and social acceptability
- The complexity of fully proportional representation for single-crossing electorates
- Maximal Condorcet domains. A further progress report
- On the ranking of bilateral bargaining opponents
- Sorting out single-crossing preferences on networks
- On the number of single-peaked narcissistic or single-crossing narcissistic preference profiles
- Existence of equilibria in a decentralized two-level supply chain
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5527898 (Why is no real title available?)
- Non fixed-price trading rules in single-crossing classical exchange economies
- Revealed preference domains from random choice
- Strategy-proofness and ``median voters
- Social acceptability of Condorcet committees
- Top monotonicity: a common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result
- Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel
- Single-crossing choice correspondences
- Generalized average rules as stable Nash mechanisms to implement generalized median rules
- A characterization of preference domains that are single-crossing and maximal Condorcet
- Combinatorial voter control in elections
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