Single-crossing, strategic voting and the median choice rule
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2432496
DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0098-yzbMath1098.91035MaRDI QIDQ2432496
Alejandro Saporiti, Fernando A. Tohmé
Publication date: 25 October 2006
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.ucema.edu.ar/publicaciones/download/documentos/237.pdf
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