Non fixed-price trading rules in single-crossing classical exchange economies
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Publication:2353698
DOI10.1007/s00355-014-0834-7zbMath1318.91141OpenAlexW2050750999MaRDI QIDQ2353698
Publication date: 16 July 2015
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://in.bgu.ac.il/en/humsos/Econ/Workingpapers/1311.pdf
Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Social choice (91B14)
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Cites Work
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