Non fixed-price trading rules in single-crossing classical exchange economies

DOI10.1007/S00355-014-0834-7zbMATH Open1318.91141OpenAlexW2050750999MaRDI QIDQ2353698FDOQ2353698

Authors Mridu Prabal Goswami

Publication date 16 July 2015

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://in.bgu.ac.il/en/humsos/Econ/Workingpapers/1311.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3402334 (Why is no real title available?)
• A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods
• A note on strategyproofness in Edgeworth-Box economies
• An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
• Arrow's Theorem for Economic Domains and Edgeworth Hyperboxes
• Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions
• Differentiable strategy-proof mechanisms for private and public goods in domains that are not necessarily large or quasi-linear
• Efficiency and truthfulness with Leontief preferences. A note on two-agent, two-good economies
• Efficient strategy-proof exchange and minimum consumption guarantees.
• Inefficiency of strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in pure exchange economies
• Inefficiency of strategy-proof rules for pure exchange economies
• Non-Bayesian optimal search and dynamic implementation
• Note on social choice allocation in exchange economies with many agents
• Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation
• Robust trading mechanisms
• Single-crossing, strategic voting and the median choice rule
• Strategy proofness and Pareto efficiency in quasilinear exchange economies
• Strategy-Proof Exchange
• Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
• Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in exchange economies: General domain properties and applications
• Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies
• Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on the cobb-Douglas domain of exchange economies
• Top monotonicity: a common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result
• Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
• When are local incentive constraints sufficient?

Cited in

(4)

• Allais' trading process and the dynamic evolution of a market economy
• Aggregating the single crossing property
• Price-mediated trade with quantity signals: An axiomatic approach.
• Non-dictatorial public distribution rules

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