Inefficiency of strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in pure exchange economies
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Publication:1178178
DOI10.1007/BF00177662zbMath0745.90016OpenAlexW1990418650MaRDI QIDQ1178178
Publication date: 26 June 1992
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00177662
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