A mechanism design approach to allocating central government funds among regional development agencies
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Publication:2254237
DOI10.1007/s10058-014-0160-7zbMath1329.91081OpenAlexW2067896714MaRDI QIDQ2254237
Özgür Kıbrıs, Ịpek Gürsel Tapkı
Publication date: 4 February 2015
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-014-0160-7
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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