A mechanism design approach to allocating central government funds among regional development agencies

DOI10.1007/S10058-014-0160-7MaRDI QIDQ2254237zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Özgür Kıbrıs, Ịpek Gürsel Tapkı

Publication date 4 February 2015

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-014-0160-7

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyfairnessregional development agenciessingle peakednessstrategy proofnessuniform mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cites work

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• The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• The uniform rule with several commodities: a generalization of Sprumont's characterization

Cited in

(4)

• Interregional redistribution and budget institutions with private information on intergenerational externality
• Optimal interregional redistribution and local budget rules with multidimensional heterogeneity
• Asymmetric price adjustment and price discovery in spot and futures markets of agricultural commodities
• Interregional spillovers and optimal budget institutions under asymmetric information

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