Strategy-proofness and efficiency are incompatible in production economies

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2004.04.023zbMath1254.91149OpenAlexW2133971780MaRDI QIDQ1927624

Justin Leroux

Publication date: 1 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~econ/papers/2004papers/07leroux.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencystrategy-proofnessproduction economies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (7)

Sharing the Cost of Global Warming* ⋮ Profit sharing in unique Nash equilibrium: characterization in the two-agent case ⋮ Strategy-proofness in linear production economies with homothetic or quasi-linear preferences ⋮ Cooperative production under diminishing marginal returns: interpreting fixed-path methods ⋮ Cost Sharing in Production Economies ⋮ A mechanism design approach to allocating central government funds among regional development agencies ⋮ Cooperative production and efficiency

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• A note on strategyproofness in Edgeworth-Box economies
• Inefficiency of strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in pure exchange economies
• Efficient strategy-proof allocation functions in linear production economies
• Inefficiency of strategy-proof rules for pure exchange economies
• Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies
• Toward general impossibility theorems in pure exchange economies
• Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in exchange economies: General domain properties and applications

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