Toward general impossibility theorems in pure exchange economies
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Publication:2567938
DOI10.1007/s003550100143zbMath1072.91545OpenAlexW2038454787MaRDI QIDQ2567938
Publication date: 14 October 2005
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550100143
Related Items (11)
Strategy-proofness and efficiency are incompatible in production economies ⋮ Locally efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in exchange economies ⋮ Egalitarian division under Leontief preferences ⋮ Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in many-agent economies ⋮ Note on social choice allocation in exchange economies with many agents ⋮ Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on the cobb-Douglas domain of exchange economies ⋮ Continuous selections from the Pareto correspondence and non-manipulability in exchange economies ⋮ Strategy-proof risk sharing ⋮ Efficient strategy-proof exchange and minimum consumption guarantees. ⋮ Efficient mixtures of priority rules for assigning objects ⋮ Inefficiency of strategy-proof rules for pure exchange economies
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