Note on social choice allocation in exchange economies with many agents
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2447066
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2012.10.008zbMATH Open1285.91086OpenAlexW2068579157MaRDI QIDQ2447066FDOQ2447066
Authors: Takeshi Momi 
Publication date: 23 April 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.10.008
Recommendations
- Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in many-agent economies
- Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in economies with many goods
- Toward general impossibility theorems in pure exchange economies
- Inefficiency of strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in pure exchange economies
- Efficient strategy-proof exchange and minimum consumption guarantees.
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Continuity Properties of the Core of a Market
- Inefficiency of strategy-proof rules for pure exchange economies
- Efficient strategy-proof exchange and minimum consumption guarantees.
- Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies
- Inefficiency of strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in pure exchange economies
- Efficiency and truthfulness with Leontief preferences. A note on two-agent, two-good economies
- Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on the cobb-Douglas domain of exchange economies
- Toward general impossibility theorems in pure exchange economies
- Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in exchange economies: General domain properties and applications
- Note on social choice allocation in exchange economies with Cobb-Douglas preferences
Cited In (8)
- Note on social choice allocation in exchange economies with Cobb-Douglas preferences
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in many-agent economies
- Toward general impossibility theorems in pure exchange economies
- Non fixed-price trading rules in single-crossing classical exchange economies
- Locally efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in exchange economies
- Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in economies with many goods
- Egalitarian division under Leontief preferences
This page was built for publication: Note on social choice allocation in exchange economies with many agents
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2447066)
