Efficient strategy-proof exchange and minimum consumption guarantees.

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00019-XzbMath1090.91027OpenAlexW2145847323MaRDI QIDQ1812176

Shigehiro Serizawa, John A. Weymark

Publication date: 18 June 2003

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00019-x

zbMATH Keywords

social choicestrategy-proofnessexchange economies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (22)

Non-dictatorial public distribution rules ⋮ Locally efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in exchange economies ⋮ Implementability under monotonic transformations in differences ⋮ A Hurwicz type result in a model with public good production ⋮ Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation ⋮ Second-best efficiency of allocation rules: strategy-proofness and single-peaked preferences with multiple commodities ⋮ Egalitarian division under Leontief preferences ⋮ Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in many-agent economies ⋮ Note on social choice allocation in exchange economies with many agents ⋮ Least manipulable envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities ⋮ Nash implementation with partially honest individuals ⋮ Implementation Theory ⋮ Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on the cobb-Douglas domain of exchange economies ⋮ Designing a strategyproof spot market mechanism with many traders: twenty-two steps to Walrasian equilibrium ⋮ Strategy-proof and symmetric allocation of an indivisible good ⋮ A mechanism design approach to allocating central government funds among regional development agencies ⋮ Almost-dominant strategy implementation: exchange economies ⋮ Impossibility results for parametrized notions of efficiency and strategy-proofness in exchange economies ⋮ Strategy-proof risk sharing ⋮ Introduction to a Festschrift for Karl Shell ⋮ Differentiable strategy-proof mechanisms for private and public goods in domains that are not necessarily large or quasi-linear ⋮ Non fixed-price trading rules in single-crossing classical exchange economies

Cites Work

• A note on strategyproofness in Edgeworth-Box economies
• Can everyone benefit from growth ? Two difficulties
• Inefficiency of strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in pure exchange economies
• The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
• Inefficiency of strategy-proof rules for pure exchange economies
• Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies
• Strategy-proofness and markets
• Toward general impossibility theorems in pure exchange economies
• Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in exchange economies: General domain properties and applications
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• On the Generic Nonoptimality of Dominant-Strategy Allocation Mechanisms: A General Theorem That Includes Pure Exchange Economies
• Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
• The Incentives for Price-Taking Behavior in Large Exchange Economies
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Strategy-Proof Exchange
• Continuity Properties of the Core of a Market
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