Strategy-proof and symmetric allocation of an indivisible good
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Publication:2473060
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.06.002zbMath1132.91505OpenAlexW1997520270MaRDI QIDQ2473060
Kazutoshi Ando, Shinji Ohseto, Miki Kato
Publication date: 26 February 2008
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.06.002
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The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation, Strategy-proofness versus symmetry in economies with an indivisible good and money, Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms, Collusion-proof and fair auctions
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