Strategy-proof and symmetric allocation of an indivisible good

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2007.06.002MaRDI QIDQ2473060zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Kazutoshi Ando, Miki Kato, Shinji Ohseto

Publication date 26 February 2008

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.06.002

zbMATH Keywords

indivisible goodstrategy-proofnesssymmetry

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Recommendations

• Strategy-proofness versus symmetry in economies with an indivisible good and money
• Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with an indivisible good
• Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
• Strategy-proof and efficient allocation of an indivisible good on finitely restricted preference domains
• Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods

Cites work

• An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions
• Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods
• Efficient strategy-proof exchange and minimum consumption guarantees.
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• Games of fair division
• House allocation with transfers
• Inefficiency of strategy-proof rules for pure exchange economies
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Maskin monotonicity in economies with indivisible goods and money
• Microeconomic theory
• Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities
• Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
• Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with an indivisible good
• Strategy-proof and efficient allocation of an indivisible good on finitely restricted preference domains
• Strategy-proof and nonbossy allocation of indivisible goods and money
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• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
• The fair allocation of an indivisible good when monetary compensations are possible
• The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation

Cited in

(15)

• Strategy-proof and efficient allocation of an indivisible good on finitely restricted preference domains
• Strategy-proofness of scoring allocation correspondences for indivisible goods
• Strategy-proof and nonbossy allocation of indivisible goods and money
• Strategy-proofness versus symmetry in economies with an indivisible good and money
• Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms
• Implementation of individually rational social choice functions with guaranteed utilities
• Collusion-proof and fair auctions
• Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with an indivisible good
• Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
• Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods
• Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint
• Optimal allocation of an indivisible good
• The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation
• Symmetric mechanism design
• Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods

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