Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms
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Publication:2268363
DOI10.1007/s00355-009-0393-5zbMath1201.91082MaRDI QIDQ2268363
Publication date: 5 March 2010
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0393-5
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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