Groves sealed bid auctions of heterogeneous objects with fair prices
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Publication:2568807
DOI10.1007/s003550200185zbMath1073.91581OpenAlexW1505760807MaRDI QIDQ2568807
Publication date: 19 October 2005
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550200185
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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