Gale’s Fixed Tax for Exchanging Houses
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Publication:5870368
DOI10.1287/moor.2021.1244zbMath1505.91261OpenAlexW4220926156MaRDI QIDQ5870368
Lars-Gunnar Svensson, Ryan Tierney, Lars Ehlers, Tommy Andersson
Publication date: 9 January 2023
Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2021.1244
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