Notions of anonymity for object assignment: impossibility theorems
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Publication:2299463
DOI10.1007/S10058-019-00223-1zbMATH Open1432.91066OpenAlexW3123606360WikidataQ127445997 ScholiaQ127445997MaRDI QIDQ2299463FDOQ2299463
Authors: Hikaru Kondo
Publication date: 21 February 2020
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11094/51283
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Cites Work
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- Probabilistic assignment of indivisible goods with single-peaked preferences
- A short proof for the characterization of the core in housing markets
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