Notions of anonymity for object assignment: impossibility theorems

DOI10.1007/S10058-019-00223-1MaRDI QIDQ2299463zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Hikaru Kondo

Publication date 21 February 2020

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/11094/51283

zbMATH Keywords

impartialityanonymityindivisible goods

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Recommendations

• Impossibilities for probabilistic assignment
• Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity
• Probabilistic assignments of identical indivisible objects and uniform probabilistic rules
• Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment
• A new fairness notion in the assignment of indivisible resources

Cites work

• A new solution to the random assignment problem.
• A short proof for the characterization of the core in housing markets
• Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
• Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation
• House allocation with existing tenants
• On cores and indivisibility
• Probabilistic assignment of indivisible goods with single-peaked preferences
• Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
• Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations
• Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
• The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods

Cited in

(3)

• Set agreement power is not a precise characterization for oblivious deterministic anonymous objects
• Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity
• Gale’s Fixed Tax for Exchanging Houses

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