A short proof for the characterization of the core in housing markets
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Publication:498757
DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2014.11.019zbMATH Open1321.91060OpenAlexW1979857529MaRDI QIDQ498757FDOQ498757
Authors: Hidekazu Anno 
Publication date: 29 September 2015
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.11.019
Recommendations
- Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems
- Cores and mechanisms in restricted housing markets
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- Alternative characterizations of the top trading cycles rule in housing markets
- An elementary non-constructive proof of the non-emptiness of the core of the housing market of Shapley and Scarf
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Cites Work
- On cores and indivisibility
- Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
- House allocation with existing tenants
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- Kidney Exchange
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
- Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
Cited In (16)
- Top trading cycles
- Pair-efficient reallocation of indivisible objects
- Object reallocation problems under single-peaked preferences: two characterizations of the crawler
- The crawler: three equivalence results for object (re)allocation problems when preferences are single-peaked
- Matching with single-peaked preferences
- Trading probabilities along cycles
- An alternative proof of a characterization of the TTC mechanism
- An elementary non-constructive proof of the non-emptiness of the core of the housing market of Shapley and Scarf
- Alternative characterizations of the top trading cycles rule in housing markets
- A unified approach to strategy-proofness of the deferred-acceptance rule and the top-trading cycles rule
- Object reallocation problems with single-dipped preferences
- Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation
- Notions of anonymity for object assignment: impossibility theorems
- Computing the Deficiency of Housing Markets with Duplicate Houses
- On endowments and indivisibility: partial ownership in the Shapley-Scarf model
- Efficient and incentive compatible exchange of real-time information
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