A short proof for the characterization of the core in housing markets

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2014.11.019MaRDI QIDQ498757zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hidekazu Anno

Publication date 29 September 2015

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.11.019

zbMATH Keywords

corestrategy-proofnesshousing market

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Recommendations

• Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems
• Cores and mechanisms in restricted housing markets
• Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
• Alternative characterizations of the top trading cycles rule in housing markets
• An elementary non-constructive proof of the non-emptiness of the core of the housing market of Shapley and Scarf

Cites work

• House allocation with existing tenants
• Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
• Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
• Kidney Exchange
• On cores and indivisibility
• Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
• Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
• Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods

Cited in

(16)

• Object reallocation problems under single-peaked preferences: two characterizations of the crawler
• Top trading cycles
• Pair-efficient reallocation of indivisible objects
• The crawler: three equivalence results for object (re)allocation problems when preferences are single-peaked
• Matching with single-peaked preferences
• Trading probabilities along cycles
• An alternative proof of a characterization of the TTC mechanism
• An elementary non-constructive proof of the non-emptiness of the core of the housing market of Shapley and Scarf
• Alternative characterizations of the top trading cycles rule in housing markets
• A unified approach to strategy-proofness of the deferred-acceptance rule and the top-trading cycles rule
• Object reallocation problems with single-dipped preferences
• Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation
• Notions of anonymity for object assignment: impossibility theorems
• On endowments and indivisibility: partial ownership in the Shapley-Scarf model
• Computing the Deficiency of Housing Markets with Duplicate Houses
• Efficient and incentive compatible exchange of real-time information

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