A short proof for the characterization of the core in housing markets
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Recommendations
- Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems
- Cores and mechanisms in restricted housing markets
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- Alternative characterizations of the top trading cycles rule in housing markets
- An elementary non-constructive proof of the non-emptiness of the core of the housing market of Shapley and Scarf
Cites work
- House allocation with existing tenants
- Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
- Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
- Kidney Exchange
- On cores and indivisibility
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
Cited in
(16)- Object reallocation problems under single-peaked preferences: two characterizations of the crawler
- Top trading cycles
- Pair-efficient reallocation of indivisible objects
- The crawler: three equivalence results for object (re)allocation problems when preferences are single-peaked
- Matching with single-peaked preferences
- Trading probabilities along cycles
- An alternative proof of a characterization of the TTC mechanism
- An elementary non-constructive proof of the non-emptiness of the core of the housing market of Shapley and Scarf
- Alternative characterizations of the top trading cycles rule in housing markets
- A unified approach to strategy-proofness of the deferred-acceptance rule and the top-trading cycles rule
- Object reallocation problems with single-dipped preferences
- Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation
- Notions of anonymity for object assignment: impossibility theorems
- On endowments and indivisibility: partial ownership in the Shapley-Scarf model
- Computing the Deficiency of Housing Markets with Duplicate Houses
- Efficient and incentive compatible exchange of real-time information
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