Alternative characterizations of the top trading cycles rule in housing markets

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2021.109806MaRDI QIDQ2660053zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yajing Chen, Fang Zhao

Publication date 29 March 2021

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109806

zbMATH Keywords

characterizationshousing marketrank monotonicitytop trading cycles rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Recommendations

• An alternative characterization of top trading cycles
• Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants
• A unified approach to strategy-proofness of the deferred-acceptance rule and the top-trading cycles rule
• Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation
• Cores and mechanisms in restricted housing markets

Cites work

• A short proof for the characterization of the core in housing markets
• An alternative proof of a characterization of the TTC mechanism
• Axioms for deferred acceptance
• Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
• Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation
• Matching with single-peaked preferences
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• New axioms for deferred acceptance
• On cores and indivisibility
• Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
• Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities

Cited in

(10)

• An alternative proof of a characterization of the TTC mechanism
• Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation
• A new allocation rule for the housing market problem with ties
• Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants
• An alternative characterization of top trading cycles
• Two simple variations of top trading cycles
• A short proof for the characterization of the core in housing markets
• A unified approach to strategy-proofness of the deferred-acceptance rule and the top-trading cycles rule
• Characterizing the typewise top-trading-cycles mechanism for multiple-type housing markets
• Some new characterizations of top trading cycles

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