Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2019.104948MaRDI QIDQ2334138zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mehmet Karakaya, Bettina Klaus, Jan Christoph Schlegel

Publication date 7 November 2019

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.104948

zbMATH Keywords

consistencyhouse allocationmatchingstrategy-proofnesstop trading cycles

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

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Cites work

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• Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods

Cited in

(9)

• House allocation with existing tenants
• A new allocation rule for the housing market problem with ties
• Swap-flexibility in the assignment of houses
• Alternative characterizations of the top trading cycles rule in housing markets
• Reallocation with priorities and minimal envy mechanisms
• Characterizing the TTC rule via pair-efficiency: a short proof
• Group incentive-compatible allocation of discrete resources when ownership is partitioned
• Obviously strategy-proof implementation for mixed-ownership object-allocation problems
• House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization

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