Consistent strategy-proof assignment by hierarchical exchange

DOI10.1007/S00199-013-0774-YMaRDI QIDQ2447169zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Rodrigo A. Velez

Publication date 24 April 2014

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-013-0774-y

zbMATH Keywords

consistencystrategy-proofnessgroup strategy-proofnessreallocation-proofnessconsistent hierarchical exchange ruleshierarchical exchange rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Consistency in house allocation problems
• Consistent house allocation
• Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
• Efficient priority rules
• House allocation with existing tenants
• House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization
• Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
• Local and global consistency properties for student placement
• On cores and indivisibility
• On properties of division rules lifted by bilateral consistency
• Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
• Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
• The Impossibility of Bayesian Group Decision Making with Separate Aggregation of Beliefs and Values
• The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach

Cited in

(12)

• Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants
• Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem
• The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
• Pareto-optimal assignments by hierarchical exchange
• Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources
• Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems
• Pareto-optimal matching allocation mechanisms for boundedly rational agents
• Incompatibility between stability and consistency
• Strategy-proofness and identical preferences lower bound in allocation problem of indivisible objects
• On the consistency of random serial dictatorship
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
• Consistent house allocation

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