Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems
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Publication:1867775
DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(02)00059-9zbMATH Open1010.90034MaRDI QIDQ1867775FDOQ1867775
Authors: Lars Ehlers, Bettina Klaus, Szilvia Pápai 
Publication date: 2 April 2003
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Recommendations
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- Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
- Corrigendum to ``Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems
- Algorithms and Computation
- Algorithms and Computation
- Solving house allocation problems with risk-averse agents
Cites Work
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- Consistency in house allocation problems
- House allocation with existing tenants
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population
- Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation
- Scheduling with Opting Out: Improving upon Random Priority
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- Queue allocation of indivisible goods
- A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution
- A note on the strong core of a market with indivisible goods
- On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
- On the Shapley-Scarf economy: The case of multiple types of indivisible goods
Cited In (35)
- Population monotonic and strategy-proof mechanisms respecting welfare lower bounds
- Pareto-optimal matching allocation mechanisms for boundedly rational agents
- The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects
- Reclaim-proof allocation of indivisible objects
- Population-monotonicity and separability for economies with single-dipped preferences and the assignment of an indivisible object
- On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- Fair and efficient student placement with couples
- Pairwise kidney exchange
- The complexity of economic equilibria for house allocation markets
- House allocation when availability of houses may change unexpectedly
- Strategy-proof house allocation with price restrictions
- Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources
- Size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problem
- Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics
- Strategy-proofness and identical preferences lower bound in allocation problem of indivisible objects
- Pareto-optimal assignments by hierarchical exchange
- Coalitional strategy-proofness and resource monotonicity for house allocation problems
- Corrigendum to ``Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems
- House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization
- Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation
- Consistent house allocation
- Efficient priority rules
- On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
- House allocation with transfers
- Consistent strategy-proof assignment by hierarchical exchange
- Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems
- Hierarchical allocation
- Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation
- Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
- House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
- Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices
- Reassignment-proof rules for land rental problems
- Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems
- Local and global consistency properties for student placement
- Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities
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