Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems
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Publication:1867775
DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(02)00059-9zbMath1010.90034MaRDI QIDQ1867775
Bettina Klaus, Lars Ehlers, Szilvia Pápai
Publication date: 2 April 2003
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (20)
Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics ⋮ House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence ⋮ Consistent house allocation ⋮ Local and global consistency properties for student placement ⋮ Hierarchical allocation ⋮ Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities ⋮ Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources ⋮ Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices ⋮ Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets ⋮ Fair and efficient student placement with couples ⋮ Pareto-optimal matching allocation mechanisms for boundedly rational agents ⋮ Pareto-optimal assignments by hierarchical exchange ⋮ Coalitional strategy-proofness and resource monotonicity for house allocation problems ⋮ On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems ⋮ On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems ⋮ House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization ⋮ Strategy-proofness and identical preferences lower bound in allocation problem of indivisible objects ⋮ Efficient priority rules ⋮ The complexity of economic equilibria for house allocation markets ⋮ Pairwise kidney exchange
Cites Work
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- A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution
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- Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- Queue allocation of indivisible goods
- Consistency in house allocation problems
- House allocation with existing tenants
- On cores and indivisibility
- On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population
- Scheduling with Opting Out: Improving upon Random Priority
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- On the Shapley-Scarf economy: The case of multiple types of indivisible goods
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
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