House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization
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Publication:980969
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.10.010zbMath1230.91148OpenAlexW3124032376MaRDI QIDQ980969
Publication date: 8 July 2010
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.10.010
consistencymatchingPareto efficiencyindividual rationalitystrategy-proofnessneutralityhouse allocation
Related Items (29)
Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice ⋮ House allocation when availability of houses may change unexpectedly ⋮ Alternative characterizations of Boston mechanism ⋮ Incompatibility between stability and consistency ⋮ Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods ⋮ When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment? ⋮ Reallocation with priorities and minimal envy mechanisms ⋮ Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification ⋮ Strategyproof allocation mechanisms with endowments and M-convex distributional constraints ⋮ Efficient and incentive compatible exchange of real-time information ⋮ Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf ⋮ Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources ⋮ Endogenous budget constraints in the assignment game ⋮ On reachable assignments in cycles ⋮ On endowments and indivisibility: partial ownership in the Shapley-Scarf model ⋮ Reclaim-proof allocation of indivisible objects ⋮ A note on object allocation under lexicographic preferences ⋮ The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach ⋮ Consistent strategy-proof assignment by hierarchical exchange ⋮ Swap-flexibility in the assignment of houses ⋮ Markovian assignment rules ⋮ Designing mechanisms to focalize welfare-improving strategies ⋮ Strategy-proofness and identical preferences lower bound in allocation problem of indivisible objects ⋮ Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation ⋮ Making just school assignments ⋮ Influence in private-goods allocation ⋮ Random mechanisms for house allocation with existing tenants ⋮ Matching with restricted trade ⋮ Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants
Cites Work
- Coalitional strategy-proofness and resource monotonicity for house allocation problems
- Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation
- Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems
- Consistency in the probabilistic assignment model
- Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
- Consistent house allocation
- Exchange in a general market with indivisible goods
- Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- Consistency in house allocation problems
- House allocation with existing tenants
- On cores and indivisibility
- Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
- Kidney Exchange
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
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