Swap-flexibility in the assignment of houses
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Publication:2222205
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.07.006zbMath1457.91204OpenAlexW3049548537MaRDI QIDQ2222205
Publication date: 26 January 2021
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.07.006
Related Items (1)
Cites Work
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