Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations
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Publication:836935
DOI10.1007/s00355-009-0376-6zbMath1190.91078OpenAlexW2134649672MaRDI QIDQ836935
Publication date: 9 September 2009
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0376-6
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Social choice (91B14)
Related Items (32)
On revenue maximization with sharp multi-unit demands ⋮ Overlapping multiple object assignments ⋮ Characterizing incentive compatible, Pareto optimal and sufficiently anonymous constrained combinatorial mechanisms – Two players case ⋮ Assignment problems with complementarities ⋮ Autocratic Mechanisms: A Form of Dictatorship in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions ⋮ Truthfulness in advertising? Approximation mechanisms for knapsack bidders ⋮ Ordinal Maximin Share Approximation for Goods ⋮ Multi resource allocation with partial preferences ⋮ Multi-agent task allocation under unrestricted environments ⋮ Centralized allocation in multiple markets ⋮ Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources ⋮ Impossibilities for probabilistic assignment ⋮ Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices ⋮ Strategy-proofness of scoring allocation correspondences for indivisible goods ⋮ Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand ⋮ Matching with quorums ⋮ A general equivalence theorem for allocation of indivisible objects ⋮ Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in many-agent economies ⋮ Probabilistic assignment problem with multi-unit demands: a generalization of the serial rule and its characterization ⋮ Swap-flexibility in the assignment of houses ⋮ A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents ⋮ On the operation of multiple matching markets ⋮ Truthfulness with value-maximizing bidders: on the limits of approximation in combinatorial markets ⋮ A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for conditionally lexicographic-substitutable preferences ⋮ Notions of anonymity for object assignment: impossibility theorems ⋮ Optimization-based Mechanisms for the Course Allocation Problem ⋮ Multi-unit auctions with budget limits ⋮ When too little is as good as nothing at all: rationing a disposable good among satiable people with acceptance thresholds ⋮ Borda-induced hedonic games with friends, enemies, and neutral players ⋮ Strategy-proof popular mechanisms ⋮ Serial rules in a multi-unit Shapley-Scarf market ⋮ Dictatorial Mechanisms in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions
Cites Work
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- On cores and indivisibility
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
- Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems
- Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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