Multi-unit auctions with budget limits

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.003zbMath1279.91080OpenAlexW2151752299MaRDI QIDQ765207

Ron Lavi, Noam Nisan, Shahar Dobzinski

Publication date: 19 March 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.003

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto optimality multi-unit auctions budget constraints

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites Work