Multi-unit auctions with budget limits
From MaRDI portal
Publication:765207
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.08.003zbMATH Open1279.91080OpenAlexW2151752299MaRDI QIDQ765207FDOQ765207
Ron Lavi, Noam Nisan, Shahar Dobzinski
Publication date: 19 March 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.003
Recommendations
Cites Work
- Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
- Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations
- Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers
- Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
- Multi-item Vickrey-Dutch auctions
- Position Auctions with Budgets: Existence and Uniqueness
- Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers
- Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation
- Multiple-object auctions with budget constrained bidders
- Competitive auctions
- Behavior in Multi-Unit Demand Auctions: Experiments with Uniform Price and Dynamic Vickrey Auctions
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- An Efficient Multi-Unit Ascending Auction
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Revenue maximization when bidders have budgets
Cited In (53)
- Polyhedral clinching auctions and the AdWords polytope
- Optimal and efficient mechanisms with asymmetrically budget constrained buyers
- A simple mechanism for a budget-constrained buyer
- Tractable stochastic analysis in high dimensions via robust optimization
- The incompatibility of Pareto optimality and dominant-strategy incentive compatibility in sufficiently-anonymous budget-constrained quasilinear settings
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Efficient ex post implementable auctions and English auctions for bidders with non-quasilinear preferences
- A general impossibility theorem and its application to individual rights
- A note on the incompatibility of strategy-proofness and Pareto-optimality in quasi-linear settings with public budgets
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A note on the impossibility of multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders
- Envy-Free Revenue Approximation for Asymmetric Buyers with Budgets
- Designing efficient and incentive compatible mechanisms is almost impossible in quasi-linear environments
- Dictatorial mechanisms in constrained combinatorial auctions
- Multiple-object auctions with budget constrained bidders
- Directional monotone comparative statics
- Walrasian pricing in multi-unit auctions
- Autocratic Mechanisms: A Form of Dictatorship in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions
- Mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with budget constraints
- On envy-free revenue approximation for combinatorial buyers with budgets
- Towards characterizing the deterministic combinatorial constrained efficient space
- On the stability of generalized second price auctions with budgets
- Truthfulness in advertising? Approximation mechanisms for knapsack bidders
- Truthfulness with value-maximizing bidders: on the limits of approximation in combinatorial markets
- Bidding Strategies for Fantasy-Sports Auctions
- Overbidding and inefficiencies in multi-unit Vickrey auctions for normal goods
- On fair price discrimination in multi-unit markets
- Asymmetric budget constraints in a first-price auction
- Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity
- A near Pareto optimal auction with budget constraints
- Multiplicative Pacing Equilibria in Auction Markets
- Revenue Maximizing Envy-Free Pricing in Matching Markets with Budgets
- Repeated budgeted second price ad auction
- Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer
- On social envy-freeness in multi-unit markets
- Characterizing incentive compatible, Pareto optimal and sufficiently anonymous constrained combinatorial mechanisms – Two players case
- Market and non-market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources
- Sequential second-price auctions with private budgets
- Characterizing the incentive compatible and Pareto optimal efficiency space for two players, \(k\) items, public budget and quasilinear utilities
- Multi-unit Auctions with Budgets and Non-uniform Valuations
- Private Capacities in Mechanism Design
- Endogenous budget constraints
- Expressiveness and Robustness of First-Price Position Auctions
- Large multi-unit auctions with a large bidder
- Maximize liquid welfare in combinatorial auctions with monotone valuations
- Online random sampling for budgeted settings
- Polyhedral Clinching Auctions for Two-Sided Markets
- Optimal Design for Multi-Item Auctions: A Robust Optimization Approach
- Clinching auctions with online supply
- Strong activity rules for iterative combinatorial auctions
- Auction design for value maximizers with budget and return-on-spend constraints
- Polyhedral clinching auctions for indivisible goods
- Rank-preserving multidimensional mechanisms: an equivalence between identical-object and heterogeneous-object models
This page was built for publication: Multi-unit auctions with budget limits
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q765207)
